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Current military doctrine is primarily hierarchical in 
nature with respect to power and authority.  The 
“Functional Concept of Battlespace Awareness” (FCBA) is a 
military sensor methodology that employs a hierarchical 
command structure to test emerging technologies.  
Asymmetric warfare, however, demands a faster and more 
adaptive warfighting mentality that distributes power and 
responsibility across more of our forces; particularly 
those that are at the frontlines of the battlefield.  
“Power to the Edge” is a warfighting concept that 
emphasizes a departure from traditional military 
hierarchies and a transition into a configuration that 
empowers “Edge” actors with information and authority.  The 
exploitation of tactical opportunities by edge actors is 
essential to victory for an edge organization, and 
fundamentally what makes it more effective than traditional 
hierarchies.  This thesis will explore the concept that 
“Power to the Edge” doctrine is a more effective way to 
fight the enemies we will likely face in the Information 
Age.  By analyzing and interpreting data collected at the 
Extended Awareness II and Extended Awareness IIB 
experiments, this thesis intends to explore an example of 
transition in our current command and control methodology 
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1I. METHODOLOGIES 
A.   THESIS INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE  
The Information Age is certainly changing the ways in 
which our military will fight the battles of the future. 
What is not certain is the command and control doctrine 
best-suited for the U.S. military of the future. This 
thesis will compare and contrast two different 
methodologies for command and control: 1) Functional 
Concept for Battlespace Awareness (FCBA) 2) Power to the 
Edge.  To do this, this thesis will use data collected at a 
series of experiments entitled Extended Awareness (EA).  EA 
investigates how new advances in tactical sensor 
technologies, fusion systems, and display systems will 
change our military’s battlefield situational awareness. EA 
experimentation is done within the framework of FCBA 
command and control concepts.    
To further examine the ideas set forth in both FCBA 
and Power to the Edge, this thesis will use data and 
observations from EA.  Specifically, data collected from an 
acoustic gunshot location sensor called Shotspotter will be 
used to explore the potential effectiveness of FCBA and 
Power to the Edge.  To examine FCBA and Power to the Edge 
using Shotspotter as an example, this thesis is organized 
as follows: 
• Background information on FCBA and Power to the 
Edge 
• An overview on what Shotspotter is and how it 
works 
2• Summary of the fundamentals of the Extended 
Awareness experiments and data collected there 
• Analysis of how Shotspotter sensors might fit 
into future Command and Control scenarios   
This thesis intends to show ways that concepts, 
derived from Power to the Edge, can potentially be used to 
create a more agile Information Age force.  
B. FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT FOR BATTLESPACE AWARENESS (FCBA) 
1. Background 
The Functional Concept for Battlespace Awareness 
(FCBA) was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as part 
of a capabilities-based analytical construct that supports 
the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 
decision-making.1  In addition, FCBA is designed to be a 
tool to generate new ideas regarding command and control 
concepts and architectures.  FCBA was released on December 
31st, 2003. 
Most pertinent to this thesis, FCBA is used as model 
for conducting military experiments and exercises- such as 
the Extended Awareness (EA) series of experiments.  FCBA is 
designed to be a forward looking document, focused on 
military operations in or around 2015.  FCBA assumes that 
there will be tremendous amounts of sensor and information 
capabilities available in the future, and seeks to develop 
best practices for employing those capabilities.  
2. FCBA Key Concepts 
FCBA focuses on ensuring that key decision-makers are 
well informed about the condition of the battlespace.   
                     1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Functional Concept of Battlespace Awareness 
(Washington, D.C.: DoD, 2003), 10.  
3Ideally under FCBA, these decision-makers will be more 
capable of “making better decisions faster by enabling a 
more thorough understanding of the environment in which 
they operate, relevant friendly force data, the adversaries 
they face, and non-aligned actors that could aid in or 
detract from friendly force battlespace success.”2 The key 
to this enhanced decision-making ability is the presence 
and access to a ubiquitous network that promotes 
information sharing at all levels.   
Decision-makers are at the core of all important 
decisions and are empowered by both information and 
authority.  FCBA caters to the information needs of higher 
level decision-makers without strongly focusing on those of 
lower level tactical decision-makers. This is because FCBA 
is designed for operations where only higher echelon 
commanders have the authority to make decisions. While FCBA 
advocates the availability of sensor data at all levels, 
the primary focus is for information to flow upwards from 
tactical actors to support higher level commanders vested 
with the authority. Regarding the interface with decision-
makers, FCBA states the following: 
The BA Functional Concept begins and ends with the 
decision maker.  The value of BA is ultimately 
measured by its ability to interact with and provide 
decision makers with the information required for 
quality, timely decisions.  The decision maker uses 
tailor-able operational pictures to visualize the 
battlespace.3 
Thus, decisions will continue to come from above as it 
does in traditional hierarchical organizations. The forward 
looking nature of this document is that these decisions 
                     2 Functional Concept of Battlespace Awareness, 2. 
3 Functional Concept for Battlespace Awareness, 4. 
4will be bettered by new technology, leading to increased 
battlespace awareness. 
  FCBA envisions that information will be available 
across the spectrum of strategic and tactical actors, but 
that empowerment, that is authority to act upon that 
information, will still reside within the same levels of 
our current military.  This is not to say that tactical 
decision-makers have no authority to make decision, but 
that many of their actions will still be dictated by higher 
level decision makers.   
FCBA says information will flow faster and will, in 
theory, speed up the decision making cycle of those 
commanding tactical forces.  Figure(1) below shows how FCBA 
intends to get the right information, to the right 
personnel, at the right time.  
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Figure 1.   The Joint BA functional Concept (From: FCBA) 
 
5C. POWER TO THE EDGE  
1.  Background 
Power to the Edge (a Command and Control Research 
Program (CCRP) publication (2003))4 focuses on military 
operations centered at or around 2050.  CCRP is a DoD 
organization under the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)).   
CCRP is charged with: 1) improving both the state 
of the art and the state of the practice of 
command and control and 2) enhancing DoD's 
understanding of the national security 
implications of the Information Age.5  
Power to the Edge was written at the request of 
John Stenbit, the ASD(NII) who wanted to develop 
a broader understanding of the principles being 
used to develop policy, make decisions regarding 
investments in C4ISR, and provide oversight of 
ongoing DoD programs and related activities that 
will provide the ubiquitous, secure, wideband 
network that people will trust and use, populate 
with high quality of information, and use for 
developing shared awareness, collaborating 
effectively, and synchronizing their actions.6  
2. Power to the Edge Key Concepts 
Power to the Edge was written as a transformational 
guide, creating a more agile force by using principles of 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) to empower the “edge” users.   
Power to the Edge advocates empowering the “edge” of 
military organizations, defined as the point at which the 
organization interacts with its operating environment.  
Power to the Edge empowers the “edge” with information and 
authority to act in line with the commander’s intent, but 
                     4 David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Power to the Edge 
(Washington D.C.: CCRP, 2003), xiii.  
5 Command and Control Research Publications Homepage 
http://www.dodccrp.org/html2/about_program.html 16 August 2005 
6 Alberts and Hayes, xx. 
6not necessarily under the commander’s direct control.  
Empowering the “edge” creates a more direct line of 
communication between the edge actors and key decision-
makers.  
Traditional hierarchies share information vertically 
up then back down the organization.  Through the use of 
ubiquitous information sharing, Power to the Edge will 
eliminate much of the middle management that currently 
slows the decision-making cycle.  Sharing near real-time 
intelligence across the battlefield allows key decision-
makers to virtually be on the “edge” along with the literal 
tactical “edge” actors. In addition, Power to the Edge 
concepts greatly increase peer-to-peer interactions as 
required by the mission at hand.   
Power to the Edge proposes robust information sharing 
through the use of a single ubiquitous network.  This 
hypothetical ubiquitous network would link all relevant 
people, data bases, and systems in a matter unrestrained by 
bandwidth or computing power.  When fully applied to 
systems architectures, the result will be an edge 
infostructure that has the characteristics of DoD’s future 
Global Information Grid (GIG).7  The GIG (shown in Figure 
(2)) is a concept that will notionally combine massive 
databases, intelligence analysts, huge amounts of sensor 
data, and complete information sharing in order to bridge 
the gap between strategic and tactical decision-makers.  
Overall, the GIG enables full information sharing across 
the entire spectrum of relevant forces- the ultimate goal 
of an edge organization.   
                     7 Alberts and Hayes, 180. 
7 
Figure 2.   GIG Model (From: Power to the Edge, 183) 
Figure (2) shows a conceptual model of how information 
sharing might take place in the future.  At the center, all 
personnel involved have access to the same information 
across the spectrum of data collection methods, from 
various coalition forces to national sensors.  Ideally, 
this will allow all connected on the grid to share not only 
information, but understanding of that information.  
Enabling Power to the Edge is not an easy task and 
requires an almost complete restructuring of current 
military command and control conventions.  Rather than 
making the majority of key decisions, commanders will be 
responsible for creating the conditions to successfully 
enable the edge without sacrificing military wisdom that 
comes from experience.  Under Power to the Edge, commanders 
will find themselves in a position to exercise command more 
in the planning stages of operations than in the 
operational stages of the battle.  This will allow their 
8empowered edge actors more freedom of action during combat 
because edge actors will not, necessarily, be bound by 
direct orders from commanders.  Although this may seem to 
relinquish commanders from controlling their forces, 
commanders will still maintain control by: 
●  Creating congruent command intent across the 
enterprise; 
● Allocating resources dynamically; and 
● Establishing rules of engagement and other 
mechanisms that the fighting forces implement 
themselves.8  
Power to the Edge concepts empower tactical “edge” 
actors with the knowledge and authority previously reserved 
for higher echelon commanders. Empowering the “edge” 
requires a drastic change in current military culture, 
training and doctrine, but offers far greater agility in 
exchange. 
 
D. CONTRASTING METHODOLOGIES 
1. Similarities 
The similarities between FCBA and Power to the Edge 
are abundant, and the enabling fundamentals of both 
methodologies are worth mentioning. Both recognize that the 
key to an effective fighting force is Network Centric 
Warfare and Operations (NCW/NCO). FCBA and Power to the 
Edge both rely upon a ubiquitous network to provide 
information sharing throughout friendly and coalition 
forces. The information to enable NCW/NCO in both concepts 
relies upon massive amounts of sensors that feed tactical 
                     8 Alberts and Hayes, 5. 
9and higher level commanders. Stovepipe architectures are 
eschewed by both methodologies in preference for a far more 
connected and adaptable architecture. 
 
2. Differences 
The similarities between the FCBA and Power to the 
Edge concepts are many, but it is the differences that shed 
light on potential advantages of an edge-organized 
military. The truly new concept of Power to the Edge is the 
empowerment of “edge” actors.  While both FCBA and Power to 
the Edge stress the importance of information sharing 
through a ubiquitous network, only the Power to the Edge 
concept advocates a shift towards empowering the people at 
the tip of the spear with authority. Power to the Edge 
empowers edge actors with authority to act upon their 
increased battlespace awareness in accordance with the 
promulgated commander’s intent. It is this key concept that 
defines Power to the Edge battlespace awareness. Power to 
the Edge puts forth the idea that greater situational 
awareness at lower levels warrants increased authority to 
act at those lower echelons. It follows that Edge actors 
will, in theory, have an extremely high level of agility 
since they are empowered with the authority and situational 
awareness to act against emerging threats.  This desired 
agility is an important distinction because it demands a 
fundamental evolution in military organization. 
FCBA uses a traditional military hierarchy (chain of 
command) to exercise command, and only uses a mesh topology 
(defined in Figure (3)) to link all echelons for 
information flow only. 
10
Mesh Topology  
Devices are connected with 
many redundant interconnections 
between network nodes. In a true 
mesh topology every node has a 
connection to every other node in 
the network.  
Figure 3.   Mesh Topology (From: 
http://www.webopedia.com/quick_ref/topologies.asp) 
  Power to the Edge relies on much more adaptable and 
agile organization, with both information and authority 
residing in those edge actors involved in a mission. Table 
(1) shows a comprehensive breakdown between edge 
organizations and traditional hierarchical organizations, 
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Table 1.   Comparison of Attributes of Hierarchies and Edge 
Organizations. (From: Power to the Edge, 218) 
3. Innovative nature of Power to the Edge 
Power to the Edge is an innovative concept because it 
promotes a drastic departure from conventional military 
organization. It recognizes that the Information Age has 
dramatically altered the face of war. This is because newer 
and more versatile information networks are appearing, 
making strict hierarchies less agile in comparison. The 
USAF Scientific Advisory Board recognized in 1995 that “new 
networks emerging today are ‘geodesic,’ that is global, 
non-hierarchical and without any central node.” They 
predicted that “it is a safe bet that our [military] 
organizations will follow suit.”9 Power to the Edge provides 
the fundamentals which our forces can use to transform 
themselves into a more agile organization. This will 
theoretically develop a network-centric force capable of 
countering equally agile Information Age threats. This 
force will rely upon NCW fundamentals such as: 
• A robustly networked force improves information 
sharing 
• Information sharing enhances the quality of 
information and shared situational awareness 
• Shared situational awareness enables 
collaboration and self-synchronization, and 
enhances sustainability and speed of command. 
                     9 Gregory A. Roman, “The Command or Control Dilemma: When Technology 
and Organizational Orientation Collide.” Maxwell Papers, no. 8 (1997): 
2. 
12
• These, in turn, dramatically increase mission 
effectiveness.10 
This agility, the capability to fight the emerging 
“geodesic” threats in Information Age warfare, requires a 
change in the empowerment of edge personnel in military 
operations. Power to the Edge reduces the importance of the 
chain of command with regards to decision-making during 
combat operations. Power to the Edge lays the onus on 
commanders to develop the initial conditions that will put 
their lower level “edge actors” in the best position to 
succeed in the battlespace. This is necessary as the faster 
tempo of Information Age warfare negates the ability of 
commanders to work within a decision cycle that works 
within combat operations time-scales. This is an emerging 
characteristic of modern warfare. 
During Operation DESERT STORM, considered to be the 
first “Information Age war” by many, the speed of events 
limited General Schwarzkopf’s command and control ability.11 
Specifically it was “the unexpected rapidity with which the 
Marines advanced on the right accelerated events beyond 
Schwarzkopf’s ability to precisely control them.”12  It was 
his clear commander’s intent that allowed his subordinates 
to act without his direct control. So detailed and well 
understood was his commander’s intent that with the 
exception of one decision regarding timing, “Schwarzkopf 
could have left the theater to his subordinates to carry 
                     10 DoD Office of Force Transformation, The Implementation of Network-
Centric Warfare (Washington, D.C.: DoD, 2005), 7.   
11 David J. Lonsdale, The Nature of War in the Information Age (New 
York: Cass, 2004), 70. 
12 Carl H. Builder and Steven C. Bankes and Richard Nordin, Command 
Concepts: A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control 
(Washington, D.C.: RAND, 1999), 70.  
13
out his plans.”13  As the Information Age progresses and the 
tempo of war increases, this style of decentralized 
leadership will be necessary at lower and lower levels. 
Power to the Edge advocates this shift to a higher degree 
of autonomy at lower levels. 
 This autonomy at lower levels in not a new concept 
either. Van Creveld states that, “historically speaking, 
those armies that have been most successful … did not turn 
their troops into automatons, did not attempt to control 
everything from the top, and allowed subordinate commanders 
considerable latitude.”14 Power to the Edge is innovative 
because it points out that Information Age technology 
enables and requires this concept to be applied to even 
lower echelon actors. By doing so, Power to the Edge moves 
towards the merging of the planning and execution processes 
“into a seamless form of command and control,” as is 
envisioned in Network Centric Warfare.15  
            
Figure 4.   Traditional Edge Actor, Commander OODA Loop 
                     13 Ibid, 69. 
14 Van Creveld, 270. 
15 David S. Alberts and John J. Garstka and Frederick P. Stein, 










In terms of the traditional OODA (Observe, Orient, 
Decide, Act) loop decision model, commanders empower their 
edge units to complete the OODA loop at their lower level 
by giving them the initial tools to make the right 
decisions— tools like equipment, intelligence, techniques, 
tactics, procedures, and rules. Traditionally, the role of 
the commander is to take the edge actor’s observations and 
other intermediate commander’s information, orient them, 
and then decide upon a course of action (Figure 4).  In the 
Information Age, this is too slow because, at the very 
least, two full OODA loops cycles must be completed.  A 
thorough commander’s intent and superb situational 
awareness allows the edge actors to orient themselves 
within their environment without having to wait for 
orientation by superiors. Commanders can still rest assured 
that their subordinate’s orientation is in line with their 
vision because the edge actors have already been informed, 
via the commander’s intent, as to their role in the 
operation. 
Admiral Lord Nelson’s naval battle at Trafalgar 
provides an excellent example of a successful 
implementation of commander’s intent.  In 1805 Nelson’s 
flagship, the HMS Victory, hosted a meeting between the 
captains of Nelson’s fleet.  Knowing that communications 
would be impossible after the onset of battle, Nelson 
described a bold plan to defeat the French and Spanish 
fleets.  Nelson knew that the French and Spanish ships had 
superior firepower and size.  Nelson also knew that his 
ships were more maneuverable and manned by superior crews.  
Keeping these strengths and weaknesses in mind, Nelson 
devised a plan to attack the French and Spanish ships from 
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the side, a daring plan that would put his fleet in direct 
aim of French and Spanish broadside cannons.  Trusting the 
competence of his fleet’s captains, Nelson attacked the 
French and Spanish ships with devastating effectiveness, 
sinking 20 French and Spanish ships with no loss of British 
ships.16  Nelson’s ships broke through the French and 
Spanish ship’s lines and delivered annihilating cannon fire 
to the bows and sterns of the his enemy’s ships— inherently 
vulnerable places since the cannon shot could travel the 
full length of the ships.     
Nelson’s plan worked masterfully although, ironically, 
Nelson was killed in the battle.  The beauty of Nelson’s 
plan was not his skilled naval tactics, but in his 
empowerment of his ship’s captains.  The crux behind the 
British victory was their ability to self-synchronize, an 
idea that will be explored in greater detail later in this 
thesis.  Essentially, all of Nelson’s ships acted 
independently with only one bit of guidance: Nelson’s 
commander’s intent.  After their meeting, Nelson’s captains 
had no means to communicate with one another, a potentially 
crippling vice had Nelson not established his intent prior 
to the engagement.  Nelson’s actions epitomize using 
commander’s intent to empower edge actors.   
 Having observed and oriented themselves, edge actors 
can then decide upon a course of action that will best move 
towards the commander’s expected end-state. What enables 
edge actors to make these decisions at the lower level are 
well thought-out set of rules of engagement. These rules of 
engagement are a form of guidance as to what decisions are 
acceptable to the commander. Thus the combination of 
                     16 Alberts and Hayes, 31. 
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commander’s intent and rules of engagement allow the entire 
decision cycle to be at the edge actor’s level, reducing 
latency in the cycle. This creates a much more agile, and 
battlefield adaptable, force.  
Clearly, commander’s intent is not a new idea.  As 
shown earlier, Lord Nelson used commander’s intent to 
decisively beat the French and Spanish.  Nevertheless, Lord 
Nelson used commander’s intent out of necessity since his 
forces could not communicate.  How, then, will commander’s 
intent be different in the Information Age?   
While operating within commander’s intent is not 
a totally new concept within warfare (Caforio, 2003; 
Pratten, 1996), the extent and ubiquity of it within 
the NCW [Network-Centric Warfare] context is new.  
What’s more, it is probably one of the most 
problematical of all NCW concepts to deal with, as it 
requires a paradigm shift in tradition and culture, 
for both senior officers and junior commanders.  It 
requires development of the locus of decision-making, 
independence, empowerment and confidence in the 
decision-makers, and the requisite intelligence and 
skills for continual self-synchronization.17     
Empowering the edge-warfighters while on the 
battlefield is a difficult command and control concept to 
institute because it entails a dramatic change in 
commanders’ roles. Rather than being responsible for the 
hard decisions based on incomplete information, they are 
tasked with the creation of clear and empowering 
commander’s intent and rules of engagement. Following the 
creation of these two vital pieces of information for their 
edge actors, a commanders’ main role is to monitor the 
operation and apply changes as necessary to ensure success. 
                     17 Australian DoD Defense Science and Technology Organization, The 
Network Centric Warrior: The Human Dimension of Network Centric Warfare 
(Salisbury, Australia: DSTO, 2004), 17.  
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4. Commander’s Intent 
A concise expression of the purpose of the 
campaign or operation, the desired results and 
how operations will progress towards achieving 
the desired end-state. At the tactical level, the 
commander’s intent should be focused on the 
effect that he wishes to achieve on the enemy. 
                          -Joint Warfare Publication 0-01.1 
The commander’s intent is a major enabler of an “edge 
organization.” As previously discussed, commander’s intent 
allows edge actors to perform the orient function of the 
decision cycle on their own. The Marine Corps certainly 
views the commander’s intent as an empowering concept. 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 points out that a 
subordinate’s (an edge actor) firm understanding of the 
commander’s intent “allows us to exercise initiative in 
harmony with the commander’s desires.”18 Power to the Edge 
takes is one step further in the creation of an agile 
force. The commander’s intent will give them the ability to 
freely exercise initiative. Again, the concept of a 
commander’s intent, and its importance, is not a new idea. 
What is new from Power to the Edge is that commander’s 
intent will be necessary at much lower levels in the 
military. As a result, edge actors will be given tasks and 
intents that they are sufficiently trained and equipped to 
accomplish. 
5. Rules of Engagement (ROE) 
Crafting thorough ROE is another vital role of a 
commander in creating initial conditions conducive to 
success on the battlefield. The vast importance that ROE 
will play in future operations is a unique trait of Power 
                     18 United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6,l 
Command and Control (1996) 
http://www.tpub.com/content/usmc/mpdpup6/css/mpdpub6_120.htm  
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to the Edge.  Current rules of engagement are set forth in 
a manner that is not consistent with the vision of the 
Power to the Edge concept because, by definition, ROE limit 
the actions of our forces.  
While there is no clear way to predict the manner by 
which Information Age ROE will be written, it is clear that 
the “challenge is to get the ROE close to right before 
operations start and thereafter adapt them quickly and 
effectively as necessary.”19 It can be reasonably argued 
that more liberal ROE may be a facet of edge military 
organizations. Edge actors must be empowered with the 
authority to act, and not unduly restrained by ROE that 
prevent them from either self defense or mission 
accomplishment. Many would argue that greater freedom 
within lower echelons regarding ROE will cause poor 
decision-making by inexperienced edge actors.  Power to the 
Edge recognizes that inexperience is a shortcoming in 
current military doctrine, and insists that maintaining a 
high level of competence at the edge is crucial.  
 
6. Self-Synchronization  
Self-synchronization is the NCW tenet that proposes 
that an organization can function on its own given the 
proper conditions:  
• Clear and consistent understanding of command 
intent; 
• High quality information and shared situational 
awareness; 
• Competence at all levels of the force; and                      19 Russell W. Glenn and Gina Kingston, Urban Battle Command in the 
21st Century (Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2005), 51. 
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• Trust in the information, subordinates, 
superiors, peers and equipment.20  
 An important distinction to note here is that self-
synchronization cannot work without command; rather, self-
synchronization requires an expert level of command to meet 
the aforementioned conditions.  Ensuring clear and 
consistent understanding of command intent will be the most 
difficult self-synchronization task for the commander to 
achieve.  Power to the Edge relies less on a directed 
method of leadership and more on a focus of effort on the 
core objectives of each mission. It definitely does not 
lessen the importance or the skill required of a commander. 
The transformation is that a commander’s most important 
role becomes to impart a clear and consistent understanding 
of intent to the command. In order to do so, the commander 
will have to be more specific in stating intentions, while 
maintaining clarity of vision throughout the mission 
planning.   
 High quality of information and shared situational 
awareness may be the easiest self-synchronization tenet to 
attain for a number of reasons. Sensor capabilities and 
actionable military intelligence should be better in the 
future due to the fast pace of current technological 
progression.  Technological advances dictate that as the 
amount and quality of information increase, our ability to 
share that information will increase as well. The push to 
increase shared situational awareness is not a new goal for 
any military.  In the future, however, our ability to 
collect, process, and disseminate information will only be 
limited by our imaginations.  Nevertheless, the ability to 
                     20 Alberts and Hayes, 27. 
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make good decisions based on that information will always 
be an inescapable challenge facing military commanders.  
Since our military has always sought better 
information, progressing towards getting better information 
will be a natural step for our forces, and not necessarily 
a transformational concept. “The history of command in war 
consists essentially of an endless quest for certainty.”21 
The key to transformation into an edge organization is the 
proper application of the increased information and 
situational awareness. New technologies must be utilized in 
an edge organizational structure, not as simply new aids to 
current hierarchical structures. Thus the challenge is to 
take this natural progression in information and 
situational awareness improvement and apply it towards the 
goal of creating an edge organization. 
 Achieving competence at all levels of our forces has 
always been a continuing goal of the military. The services 
want quality people in uniform to do a good job. In the 
Information Age, “what will change, though, is the 
definition of quality.”22 Quality individuals will be ones 
who are able to deal with the authority that increased 
empowerment will place upon them. The keys to creating a 
force capable of accepting this burden of authority will be 
training and organization. First the military must 
transform itself into an edge organization. Only then can 
we begin to train our edge forces to be more capable. By 
training our forces to act via commander’s intent rather 
than direct orders, we will develop empowered edge actors.  
                     21 Martin Van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), 264. 
22 Steven Mets, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century (Carlisle 
Barracks: SSI, 2000), 74. 
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In addition, we will need to train edge forces that are 
prepared for the authority of more flexible ROE. 
Furthermore, we will need to retain experienced edge actors 
at the edge. These experienced edge actors will be capable 
of the tasks put before them, accustomed to their 
empowerment on the battlefield, and well aware of the 
different friendly capabilities to which they can 
dynamically network during combat.  This will create a more 
professional, more capable and agile military force. 
 Developing trust in information, subordinates, 
superiors, peers and equipment will also be tremendously 
challenging considering the drastic changes that are 
inherent in a shift to an edge organization. Trust can 
generally be seen as the “willingness of one person or 
group to relate to another in the belief that the other’s 
actions will be beneficial rather than detrimental, even 
though this cannot be guaranteed.”23 This is an integral 
part of the empowerment of edge actors. Although commanders 
will still be responsible for their organization’s actions, 
they must delegate their authority to the edge actors. This 
requires trust between both parties, trust that can only be 
developed through extensive training. Moreover, edge actors 
and commanders must grow to trust the sensors and networks 
that will provide them with their battlespace awareness.  
One of the concerns of enhanced battlespace awareness 
is that as commanders find themselves more informed about 
the battlespace, they may tend to move towards centralized 
control. It is only through training and trust in their 
subordinates that will prevent these commanders from 
                     23 John Child, Organization: Contemporary Principles and Practice 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 339. 
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slowing down the edge organization through direct control. 
Quite simply put, “the seductiveness of information 
technology stimulates military organizational structure 
towards greater centralized control and more rigid 
hierarchical organizations instead of the desire 
orientation of decentralized control and more flexible 
organizations.”24 This is such a great concern that FCBA 
specifically listed this as a risk of the increased 
battlespace awareness.  FCBA states: 
  Military personnel at the tactical 
level have less time to interface with BA 
[Battlespace Awareness] systems and nodes than 
those conducting operations from remote command 
posts.  Consequently, with their superior view of 
the overall battle situation, upper echelon 
commanders could be prone to exercising more 
centralized control over subordinates, 
potentially reducing their flexibility and 
effectiveness to rapidly exploit tactical 
opportunities in the battlespace.25  
 
 This idea of technology enabling centralized control 
is the antithesis of Power to the Edge concepts.  The 
exploitation of tactical opportunities by edge actors is 
the key to victory for an edge organization, and the 
fundamental theory that differentiates it from 
traditionally organized hierarchies.  Again, this is only 
possible through a great deal of trust throughout the 
organization as a whole.  Regarding trust between the 
elements of a force, Power to the Edge states, “They 
[Superiors-Subordinates] will also have to trust one 
                     24 Roman, 3. 
25 Functional Concept for Battlespace Awareness, 13. 
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another, recognizing value of synergistic efforts and their 
ability to rely on one another to achieve them.”26 
  

















A. SHOTSPOTTER BACKGROUND  
Shotspotter is an acoustic gunshot detection device 
that was developed and patented in the early 1990’s.  The 
idea of acoustic detection arose from the use of acoustic 
sensors to locate earthquakes.  Many of the triangulation 
principles used to locate earthquakes were then applied to 
locating gunfire.  After years of research and development, 
Shotspotter sensors were used to detect gunfire in Redwood 
City, California.  Results exceeded expectations and 
Redwood City’s crimes related to gunfire dropped markedly.  
The sensors have since been moved to many urban 
environments where gun related crimes plague the streets.   
The success of Shotspotter in an urban environment 
pointed to the possibility of using the same technology in 
an urban warfare or low-intensity conflict battlespace, 
leading to extensive development and testing of the 
Shotspotter system for military applications. Shotspotter 
was tested during the series of Extended Awareness 
experiments n simulated military situations such as 
convoys, patrols, and installation defense.  
 
B.  SHOTSPOTTER TECHNOLOGY 
When a gun is fired the exploding propellant creates a 
distinct acoustic signature from the muzzle blast. 
Shotspotter works by utilizing an array of directional 
acoustic sensors in conjunction with GPS location. Once the 
sensor detects a firing event, it relays its own position 
and the direction of the gunshot to a central base station. 
In the Extended Awareness II experiments, the sensors 
26
communicated through a dedicated 900 MHz line of sight 
radio link. The base station then compiles the reports of 
the sensors and deduces the type of weapon, range of the 
gunshot from each sensor, and the direction of the gunshot 
from each sensor. Utilizing the GPS location on each 
sensor, the base station is capable of producing accurate 
coordinates of the gunfire’s origin.  Shown below, figure 
(5) demonstrates how Shotspotter works at the most basic 
level.  
 
Figure 5.   Shotspotter Gunshot Detection Array (From: 
Shotspotter Patent, U.S. Patent #5,973,998)  
 
The technology behind the sensors relies upon the 
uniqueness of a gun shot’s acoustic signature. The decibel 
ranges (140-160 dB) of a gunshot are not common in the 
urban environments in which US forces are likely to deploy 
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in the future. This is due to the strength and abruptness 
of the acoustic signature associated with firearms. Only 
fireworks and automobile back-fires are of similar strength 
and abruptness, but are easily filtered by the base 
station. The groundbreaking nature of Shotspotter is the 
unique “Spatial Filtering” ability of the individual 
sensors. This software function distinguishes gunfire from 
any other sound. The specifics of Spatial Filtering are a 
closely guarded Shotspotter secret. 
 
C. SHOTSPOTTER SENSORS 
             
Figure 6.   Shotspotter Sensor (From: Shotspotter Inc. 
Military Capabilities PowerPoint) 
The sensors themselves (Figure (6)) are designed to be 
man-portable, vehicle mounted or fixed in position. They 
are 4 inches by 5 inches and weigh 1-2 lbs each.  Each 
Shotspotter sensor has its own identification code that can 
be recognized by the central Shotspotter base station in 
order to triangulate the direction of a gunshot.  When the 
central base station receives reports of gunshot 
detections, the locations of the reporting sensors are 
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cross referenced.  The Shotspotter terminal then calculates 
and displays all the information (Figure (7)) related to 
the gunshot as perceived by the sensor— time, location etc.   
  
Figure 7.   Shotspotter Central Base Station Data Table 
(From: Shotspotter Base Station Screen Capture, 18 
July 2005) 
 
If more than three Shotspotter sensors detect a 
gunshot, it is possible to have multiple triangulated 
locations.  To determine which trio of sensors has the best 
triangulated location, the data will be tested according to 
the following criteria: 
1.  Select the three sensors which give the greatest 
number of confirming impulses from other sensors.  
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2. Select the three sensors which produces the most 
widely-spread direction vectors to the event (and 
hence the most geometrically robust solution). 
3. Select the three sensors which have the highest sum 
of acoustic sharpness. 
4.  Select the three sensors which give, among the 
calculated locations from all possible triads, the 
most central location.27 
 
D.  SHOTSPOTTER LAYERED PROTECTION 
Shotspotter sensors are designed to be used in three 
configurations that provide deep protection.  The last 
layer, layer 3, is called semi-fixed because it is mostly 
immobile.  This layer would be used to detect gunfire in 
fixed positions such as a base camp or pre-positioned urban 
environments.  This layer has the widest acoustic aperture 
and is the best at countering the effects of echoes.  
Figure (8) shows the three layers.  
                     27 Shotspotter Patent. 
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Figure 8.   Shotspotter Sensor Layer Model (From: Shotspotter 
Inc. Military Capabilities PowerPoint) 
The next layer, layer 2, is the mobile unit protection 
layer where Shotspotter sensors are placed on vehicles, 
UAVs, or aircraft.  This layer provides increased mobility 
when using Shotspotter sensors while maintaining a 
relatively wide acoustic aperture.  An interesting 
advantage to this layer is three-dimensional detection when 
Shotspotter ground sensors are used in conjunction with 
airborne Shotspotter sensors.  Since the sensors are 
normally all on the ground, they are essentially on a two-
dimensional plane, so height effects are negligible.  When 
sensors are also detecting gunfire from the air, however, 
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the sensors are able to provide height as well as a GPS 
location.   
The first layer, layer 1, is the squad level layer.  
This layer is used for maximum mobility at the squad level.  
This layer has the smallest acoustic aperture and is used 
for tactical deployment.  While this layer is the most 
likely to be most useful to our forces, it unfortunately 
has the most limitations of all the layers.  In addition to 
reduced aperture, this layer has a number of inherent human 
factors.  For example, E-6 and below Marines who were using 
the Shotspotter sensors in Extended Awareness I had some of 
the following comments about carrying the sensor: 
• Sensor is too big.  
• Difficult to mount to the web gear and then turn 
on or make sure that the system is working. 
• The clips on the back of the case are weak and 
some broke.  
• The on/off switch needs to be outside of the case 
and when the system is on, all sensor info should 
be sent to the watch so we know it’s on and 
functioning.  
• Radio range is way too short.  
• Is there a way to track the individuals while in 
a building/bunker/tunnel?  
• Remove all sharp edges from the case28 
 
E.  SHOTSPOTTER AS A BLUE FORCE TRACKER 
Shotspotter sensors are each equipped with a GPS 
sensor that relays its location back to the central base 
station in a continuously updating data stream.  While this 
function requires a respectable amount of computing, it is 
necessary to compute locations when a gunshot is fired.  
                     28 Shotspotter Inc. Military Capabilities PowerPoint. 
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Since the triangulation calculations are dependent on the 
locations of the best three sensors around, their exact GPS 
locations must be known at all times in order to accurately 
locate a gunshot.  While GPS sensor data is necessary to 
perform the core Shotspotter functions, Shotspotter’s 
usefulness as a tracking mechanism is apparent as an input 
to the Common Operating Picture (COP).   
Shotspotter is not, by definition, a blue force 
tracker, since it relies on its own local network for 
tracking and data transmission.  Shotspotter sensors do not 
have the capability to transmit their location past a few 
kilometers— let alone up to a satellite for centralized 
data compilation.  Shotspotter sensors are, at the very 
least, relatively cheap (about $5000 per unit, but 
drastically cheaper if put into mass production) and could 
provide good tracking on a local network.  For example, if 
every member of a unit were equipped with a Shotspotter 
sensor, then the unit commander would have a good view of 
where all his forces were since they would appear on his 
COP. In this sense, Shotspotter sensors offer the potential 
to perform the same functions as a blue force tracker, but 
on a smaller level.   
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III. EXTENDED AWARENESS 
A.  EXPERIMENT 
1. Overview 
Extended Awareness is a series of experiments 
conducted by the Joint Operational Test Beds System (JOTBS) 
under the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).  The 
experiments are designed to integrate a number of emerging 
technologies for potential use by the DoD.  As the name 
might imply, Extended Awareness is focused on bringing 
about a greater sense of situational awareness in the 
battlespace.  To enable battlespace awareness a great deal 
of man portable, stationary, and automated sensors must be 
integrated with a single objective in mind: enhance our war 
fighting capabilities through improved situational 
awareness and shared information.   
2. Key Technologies  
Extended Awareness tested many different technologies.  
Some of the key technologies were: 
• Shotspotter- acoustic gun sensor described in 
detail in Chapter II.  
• Cursor on Target (CoT) – CoT takes geographic 
information from all sensors involved in the 
experiment and shows them on a real-time COP 
(FalconView).  CoT uses a XML schema to perform 
data transmission.  
• ScanEagle – A small (40 lbs.), Boeing owned and 
operated, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that has 
advanced Electro-Optical (EO) and Infrared (IR) 
sensors.  
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• Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) – An underground 
sensor, owned and operated by Neptune Sciences 
Inc., that detects events such as moving 
vehicles.  
• The Joint Mission Support Module (JMSM) - A 
command module housed in a trailer.  The JMSM has 
the greatest amount of displayed information and 
provides the greatest situational awareness- this 
is where the mission commander is located. The 
JMSM shows the FalconView, real-time UAV video, 
among other situational awareness tools.  
• Collabcast – Provides a two-way, IP based 
broadband capability that is similar to the 
Global Broadcast System (GBS).  This allows 
streaming video, chat, and situational awareness 
to be shared throughout the system and to reach-
back locations.  
• Fusion Technology Test Bed (FTTB) – This is a 
center for data fusion and integration.  The FTTB 
will take information from the rest of the 
network and fuse it with other actionable 
information from a variety of other centralized 
intelligence mediums.  
 
B.  EXTENDED AWARENESS I 
Although this thesis is primarily concerned with 
actions taking place during Extended Awareness II and 
Extended Awareness IIB, experiment results from Extended 
Awareness I are still important because the Extended 
Awareness experiments are a series. 
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 Extended Awareness I took place in New Orleans, LA 
area from 3-16 December, 2004.  The experiment was 
conducted in conjunction with the U.S. Marine Corps 26 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Training in Urban 
Environment Exercise (TRUEX).  Extended Awareness I was a 
dissimilar unmanned aerial vehicle experiment conducted in 
order to test technical integration capabilities of ground 
sensors into the advanced sensor and situational awareness 
network established during the Forward Look experiment 
series (e.g., Cursor on Target (CoT)) augmented with 
additional innovative capabilities to enhance UAV system 
interoperability.29  
Extended Awareness I was primarily a risk mitigation 
event to surface and work through problems that might arise 
in the Extended Awareness II and Extended Awareness III 
experiments.   
 
C. EXTENDED AWARENESS II  
1. Overview 
Extended Awareness II (EA-II) took place in Ft. 
Huachuca, AZ from 11-22 July, 2005.  EA-II was a live fire 
exercise that built upon EA-I and was designed to add to 
data concerning the effectiveness of the integrated sensors 
and intelligence platforms to provide improved situational 
awareness.  
2. Information Flow 
Data from various sensors, such as Shotspotter, was 
fed back to the Cursor on Target server where it could be 
compiled into a common operating picture. Using data 
transmitted in XML format, the COP information was 
                     29 Joint Operational Test Bed System (JOTBS) Extended Awareness 1 (EA 
1) Quicklook, 30 December 2004. 
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displayed on a software system called FalconView and was 
processed through the data flow as shown in Figure (9).  
 
Figure 9.   EA-II Information Flows (From: U.S. Joint Forces 
Command) 
 This common operating picture was then given to the 
JMSM for analysis.  Data from the JMSM was given to the 
FTTB so that it could be fused with intelligence that was 
either on hand at the FTTB or available via regular 
internet at a centralized location somewhere else in the 
world.  Once intelligence had been added to the COP, a 
SALUTE report (Size, Activity, Location, Unit Description, 
Time and Date, Equipment) was given back to the “Blue Team” 
convoy vehicles. 
If the data coordinates were correct, and the system 
technology worked effectively, the ScanEagle UAV would slue 
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its camera and IR sensors to the location of interest.  The 
live video feed could be seen in both the JMSM and FTTB 
trailers for cross reference with the COP.  An example of 
the FalconView COP is shown in Figure (10).    
 
 
Figure 10.   FalconView  COP (From: FalconView COP Screen 
Capture 18 July 2005) 
3. Extended Awareness II Architecture 
In order to enable information sharing throughout the 
Extended Awareness network, a great number of different 
systems had to be integrated.  The overall system 
architecture is shown in Figure (11).  
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Figure 11.   EAII Data Architecture (From: U.S. Joint 
Forces Command, Test Plan for Extended Awareness 2) 
 
The details of the system shown in Figure (11) are 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  These network 
connections, however, are critical in understanding why 
network latency can be a problem.  The next figure (Figure 
(12)) shows the robustness of the network and its ability 
to be adaptable.   
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Figure 12.   Network Connectivity Architecture, EAII 
(From: U.S. Joint Forces Command, Test Plan for 
Extended Awareness 2) 
 Of note above are the different mediums by which data 
can be transferred.  While the local Shotspotter network 
always works on a 900 MHz radio connection, the uplink back 
to a central data collector was accomplished through three 
different data transfer systems: Enhanced Position Location 
Reporting System (EPLRS), Tactical Satellite (TACSAT), and 
High Frequency Radio (HF).  Each of these communications 
systems are shown in Figure (12), although they were tested 
independently and never used at the same time.  Each of 
they systems has its own advantages and disadvantages that 
will be explored in greater detail in the Observations 
section of this thesis.  
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D.  EXTENDED AWARENESS II-B 
1. Overview 
Extended Awareness II-B (EA-IIB) took place in the 
Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG), Yuma, Arizona from 27 to 28 
July 2005.  EA-IIB used almost exactly the same systems 
technology as EA-II, but collected data with respect to an 
additional parameter: mortar detection and location.  
Shotspotter has been used almost exclusively as a sensor to 
detect and locate gunshots.  Detecting a gunshot is 
relatively easy due to the loud and abrupt nature of a 
bullet explosion.  A mortar is different because it has a 
slower, less abrupt sound signature.  By placing an array 
of sensors around a mortar firing position, it was 
theorized that Shotspotter could locate and identify an 
enemy mortar.  To do this, ScanEagle orbited at 
approximately 1500 feet over a pre-determined mortar firing 
location in as shown in Figure (13).  
 
Figure 13.   Mortar Firing Plan EA-IIB (From: U.S. Joint 
Forces Command, Test Plan for Extended Awareness 2B) 
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In addition to Shotspotter, Cursor on Target, 
FalconView, and ScanEagle mentioned in the EA-II section, 
EA-IIB also used technologies called VICE and LOGIR: 
• Video Imagery Capability Enhancement (VICE): VICE 
is a PC-based capability that processes video 
imagery and data from sensor platforms 
(independent of the sensor platform) and provides 
the operator/analyst with more precise target 
geo-location accuracy and greater situational 
awareness.  VICE improves on the down linked 
metadata information to improve 
geo-location accuracy.  VICE provides mosaic 
displays of the video imagery and geo-registers 
the video imagery to underlying reference 
imagery.  VICE can receive and output sensor 
platform data via Cursor on Target (CoT) 
interface.  The VICE operator  creates target 
folders with target location image and five tie 
point coordinates for "man-in-the-loop"  
targeting solutions or export the target folder 
to a mensuration tool to obtain precision guided 
munitions accuracy coordinates.  The mensurated 
coordinates are exported via CoT to complete the 
targeting process.30 
• LOGIR (Low-cost Guided Imaging Rocket) was the 
kill mechanism simulated by a research team based 
out of China Lake, California.  The team would 
take coordinates given to them by the VICE team 
and would use a simulation to kill the target.  
To do this, the VICE team had a computer model of 
the area and a computer model that simulated 
controlling a Predator UAV armed with a LOGIR.   
 
2. Information Flow 
Much like the EA-II experiment, once a gunshot/mortar 
event was detected, the information was processed as 
quickly as possible through the established network.  The 
network data architecture is depicted in Figure (14): 
                     30 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Test 
Plan for Extended Awareness 2B. 2005. 
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Figure 14.   Yuma “CoT OODA” Architecture (From: U.S. 
Joint Forces Command, JOTBS)  
 
3. Extended Awareness II-B Architecture 
EA-IIB used a much simpler architecture than EA-II 
primarily because it didn’t have nearly as many testable 
parameters.  EA-IIB tested only two major parameters: 1) 
Shotspotter’s ability to detect and locate a mortar firing 
position, and 2) the amount of time it would take to 
eliminate the threat.  Therefore, the architecture to 
support such an endeavor could be much more local, and 
require much less support from outside organizations. In 
fact, there was no internet connectivity available in the 
YPG testing area. Figure (15) shows the EA-II architecture 
in its most basic form.  
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Figure 15.   EA-IIB Communications Architecture (From: 
From: U.S. Joint Forces Command, Test Plan for 
Extended Awareness 2B) 
To further simplify potential problems, a copper cable 
provided connectivity between the Shotspotter controller 
and the CoT server.  This reduced the likelihood that 
connectivity would become a problem due to the intrinsic 
difficulties of trying to setup a high-bandwidth, reliable 
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IV. DATA AND OBSERVATIONS 
A.  EXTENDED AWARENESS I DATA 
1. Quantitative Data 
During Extended Awareness I, Shotspotter had a fairly 
impressive showing and demonstrated its ability to detect 
and locate gunfire.  Since the actual GPS locations of the 
mortar firing positions were pre-determined, Shotspotter 
locating parameters were quickly compared to these 
positions to show error.  Figure (16) shows the amount of 
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Figure 16.   EA-I Shotspotter Performance (From: Extended 
Awareness 1 Quicklook) 
2. Qualitative Data 
In EA-I, Shotspotter would detect a gunshot and send 
that information back to FalconView so that ScanEagle could 
slew its cameras to the location of interest.  ScanEagle’s 
cameras scan an area approximately 100 meters by 100 
meters, so Shotspotter errors fewer than 20 meters away 
from the actual gunfire location were considered 
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successful.  According to the data collected at EA-I, 
Shotspotter correctly detected and located gunfire 85% of 
the time.  An interesting caveat along with this data is 
how well the rest of the system worked.  Even with 6 
outliers, Shotspotter averaged only 14 meters error for the 
40 recorded shots.  ScanEagle’s camera slew was, on 
average, 27 meter off of the actual target coordinates.  
The difference between each of the Shotspotter locations 
and the location that ScanEagle slewed to was, on average, 
16 meters.  This tells us that, with the exception of the 
outliers, Shotspotter located the target more effectively 
than ScanEagle.  This data also shows us that ScanEagle is 
not as accurate as Shotspotter, but ScanEagle is limited by 
the data that it is fed by Shotspotter.  Ultimately, 
ScanEagle will only work as well as Shotspotter, so 
Shotspotter location data is the most critical data in the 
experiment.   
 
B.  EXTENDED AWARENESS II DATA AND OBSERVATIONS 
1. Overall 
Data collection at EA-II was inconsistent because of 
the revolutionary nature of the experiment.  There are no 
set tables revealing how well Shotspotter worked for the 
experiment because the experiment was primarily for 
demonstration purposes.  For the most part, Shotspotter 
sensors detected the gunshots and the events appeared on 
FalconView.  On one of the firing events, it took 
approximately 3 minutes 30 seconds from the time a shot was 
fired to the time the convoy received a detailed SALUTE 
report. Shotspotter worked very well from a qualitative 
standpoint with only minor problems.   
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One example of Shotspotter’s shortcoming occurred on 
18 July at approximately 1100. Shotspotter reported a 
location that was some 123 meters away from the actual 
location during a series of shotgun firing events.  The 
error reported here turned out to be human error in sensor 
augmentation.  Shotspotter’s representative at EA-II had 
noticed a 4 degree Celsius change in the ambient 
temperature indicated by the Shotspotter sensors and 
manually adjusted the Shotspotter temperature sensors to 
the old reading.  The representative assumed that a 4 
degree change was improbable considering that the 
temperature change took place between firing events 
(approx. 30 minutes).  To correct this presumed error, the 
representative the temperature reading by hand to the old 
temperature.  Since sound travels differently through air 
at different temperatures, the alteration in the 
temperature gage caused the sensors to give a location that 
was out of view of ScanEagle and unusable for any tactical 
purposes.  
2. EA-II EPLRS Network 
The EA-II experiments used three different 
communications mediums to transmit data to and from the 
convoy.  EPLRS (Enhanced Position Location Reporting 
System) was used to transmit data to and from the convoy, 
overall, this system turned out to be an effective way to 
transmit all the data required to successfully conduct the 
experiment.  However, for approximately 15 minutes, the 
system lost all connectivity for reasons unknown and the 
convoy came to a complete halt in order to reestablish 
contact with the JMSM31.  Once the system was up and running 
                     31 This was taken from Elliott observation, available on the NPS FIRE 
KM System under “SS Log 7”. 
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again, the Blue Force Tracking element of Shotspotter was 
still failing and worked sporadically for the remainder of 
the day.   
Although the EPLRS system was able to handle the data 
loads effectively and only had one instance of lost 
connectivity, there are a few intrinsic problems with the 
EPLRS system.  EPLRS requires relay stations since it is a 
line of sight connection.  This means that relay stations 
will almost always be required to conduct operations- 
requiring additional people, training, and equipment.  
Moreover, the relay stations themselves would be endangered 
due to being placed the frontline and the JMSM.   
3. EA-II TACSAT Network 
The second day a 5K TACSAT connection was used to 
transmit all the data to and from the convoy.  Although the 
local Shotspotter network was able to detect many of the 
shots, very few of them ever appeared on FalconView due to 
the latency associated with a 5K bandwidth network.  In 
more than two firing events, Shotspotter data took well 
over 30 seconds to appear on FalconView.32  The network 
latency was such an issue that confusion arose about which 
events were taking place because events would appear 
sporadically on FalconView.   
Furthermore, genuine situational awareness was never 
fully achieved due to a failure by ScanEagle to become 
airborne, due to a fuel problem that was later corrected.  
Nevertheless, ScanEagle was scheduled to launch at 
approximate 0630 and didn’t actually become airborne until 
1104.  Once ScanEagle was up and flying, network latency 
issues plagued the experiment and several more firing 
                     32 Available on the NPS FIRE KM System, under “Data Log, JMSM 7-19C”. 
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events took in excess of 30 seconds to appear on 
FalconView.   
TACSAT, however, did have an advantage of nearly 
unlimited coverage and didn’t require a forward-deployed 
relay vehicle, but TACSAT during EA-II had insufficient 
bandwidth to transmit the amount of data needed to 
successfully conduct operations.   
4. EA-II HF Network  
On the last day of experimentation, Wednesday 20 July 
2005, HF radio was used to transmit the data to and from 
the convoy vehicles.  In terms of bandwidth constraints and 
network latency, HF was by far the worst of all the network 
communications mediums.  In addition to bandwidth issues, 
the entire convoy was not able to deploy on time due to HF 
connectivity problems.  Once the problems were fixed, HF 
proved to have the worst latency of all the networks, with 
firing events appearing on FalconView well over a minute 
after happening.  The HF network did not require satellites 
or relay stations because it does not require a line-of-
sight connection to the convoy.  HF uses reflection off of 
the ionosphere as well as the earth’s surface for 
communicating, but most involved with EA-II agreed that HF 
simply didn’t have enough bandwidth to work effectively.    
C.  EXTENDED AWARENESS II-B DATA AND OBSERVATIONS 
1. Overview 
EA-IIB was a far simpler test and had far fewer 
measurable parameters since the primary objective of EA-IIB 
was to test Shotspotter’s ability to detect and locate 
mortar fire.  The test plan for EA-IIB called for 24 
different mortar firing events.  Each event the number of 
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rounds fired, the charge used in firing, and the location 
of the firing position was varied.   
2. Problems  
Although the test plan appeared to be nearly perfect, 
a series of problems almost stopped the entire 
experimentation process.  The first, and biggest, problem 
in EA-IIB, was that the Shotspotter sensors were upwind of 
the mortar firing positions.  Heavy winds pushed most of 
the mortar’s acoustic energy downwind, away from the 
Shotspotter sensors.  The result was that the Shotspotter 
sensors were unable to detect any of the preliminary mortar 
shots.  On the few occasions where Shotspotter was able to 
detect the mortar shots, the three detecting sensors were 
receiving different information due to the wind.  The winds 
were sustained at approximately 15 knots with gusts up to 
20 knots, and were strong enough to make Shotspotter sensor 
useless.  To fix the problem, the Shotspotter sensors were 
moved.  Since the wind was blowing from the South-West, the 
sensors were moved to the North-East, as shown in Figure 
(17).  The Red arrows indicate the location of the old 
sensors, and the yellow arrow indicates approximate wind 
direction and velocity at the time of the experimentation.  
The Blue boxes represent the new Shotspotter sensor 
locations.  The two hourglass figures represent the flight 
path of ScanEagle over the mortar firing pits.  
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Figure 17.   Sensor Movement (After: FalconView screen 
capture, 28 July 2005) 
3. Results 
Once the Shotspotter sensors were moved, data 
collection went rapidly.  Experiment operators abandoned 
the idea of varying mortar charges and opted for a more Ad 
hoc approach.  Since the range closed for the day at 
approximately 1530, a day’s worth of data collection was 
squeezed into about an hour—the results of which are shown 
































1 3 3 14:17:53 0:00:13 0:00:53 0:02:47 0:03:08   





3 3 4 14:24:20         
Detected, Not 
Located. 
4 1 4 14:26:20 0:00:08 0:00:51 Missed 0:04:19 Calm Wind 
5 3 3 14:29:50 0:00:05 0:00:47 0:02:50 0:03:50 Calm Wind 
6 3 3 14:34:17 0:00:11 0:00:48 Missed 0:03:31 Calm Wind 
7 3 2 14:44:05         
Detected, Not 
Located 
8 3 4 14:45:20 0:00:07 0:00:38 0:03:20 0:04:13 Vice Reboot 
9 3 4 14:50:00 0:00:08 0:00:30 0:02:13 0:02:49   
10 3 4 14:53:28         
Detected, Not 
Located 
11 3 4 14:54:35         Flyer 1km NE 
12 3 4 14:56:20         
Detected, Not 
Located 
13 3 4 14:57:34         
Winds SE 10-15 Kts 
Detected, Not 
Located 
14 3 4 14:59:18         




15 4 4 15:02:30 0:00:15 0:00:46 0:02:00 0:03:28 
Detected, Not 
Located 
16 4 4 15:08:22 0:00:15 0:00:52 0:02:25 0:03:38 
Slightly Outside 
ScanEagle FOV 
17 4 4 15:12:30         
Detected, Not 
Located 
18 4 4 15:14:00         
Detected, Not 
Located , Wind 
# Event: 18     
Average 
Results         
# Rds: 56     0:00:10 0:00:46 0:02:36 0:03:38   
Table 2.   EA-IIB Data Table (From: U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, Joint Operational Test Bed System (JOTBS)) 
 
Here we see that Shotspotter only successfully 
detected and located a mortar firing position approximately 
44% of the time.  Also, averaging 3 minutes and 38 seconds, 
the turnaround time from target detection to target 
destruction was less than impressive, shown in Table (2).   
 
Event Time (Average) Range 
Shotspotter Report to 
ScanEagle 10 seconds 5-13 Seconds 
ScanEagle ID & 
Refinement 46 seconds 30-53 Seconds 
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VICE Geo-Registration 
& Rainstorm Target 
Geo-location 
2 Minutes 36 
Seconds 
2 minutes 30 seconds 
– 3 minutes 20 
seconds 
2 minutes 49 seconds 
- 
LOGIR Impact 
3 Minutes 38 
Seconds 4 minutes 19 seconds 
 
Table 3.   EA-IIB Compiled Data (From: U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, Joint Operational Test Bed System (JOTBS)) 
B.  EXPERIMENT COMMENTS   
1. EA-2 
The results from EA-2 are suspect because of the 
manner in which the sensor data was collected.  While there 
were Shotspotter sensors on every convoy vehicle, the major 
source of sensor data came from pre-positioned Shotspotter 
sensors that were placed in an almost circular array around 
the gunshot firing position.  Shotspotter’s recorded error 
rate was extremely good, but legitimate convoy detection 
capabilities remain uncertain.  In addition to using a pre-
positioned sensor array around a gun firing position, the 
convoy vehicles were always at a complete halt for the 
shootings.   
The Shotspotter sensors worked very well under the 
conditions used in EA-II.  Nevertheless, the conditions in 
which the sensors were used are not likely to exist in a 
real combat situation.      
2. EA-III  
Currently, Shotspotter is not an effective device for 
detecting mortar fire.  With an optimal detection rate of 
less than 50 percent, Shotspotter will need further 
development before reliably detecting mortar fire.  Also, 
its worth noting that the results regarding Shotspotter’s 
effectiveness are indicative of Shotspotter results after 
the sensors were moved to optimize the movement of acoustic 
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energy around the mortar firing pits due to heavy winds.  
Before the move, the Shotspotter sensors were not able to 
detect any of the mortar fire.  Again, this denotes a 
reliance on optimum conditions for successfully locating a 
mortar firing position, conditions that will almost 
certainly be absent from an actual battlefield.   
3. Overall 
When it worked, Shotspotter was an extremely 
impressive and powerful tool that could help our troops 
tremendously.  While the Shotspotter system, and the 
network that supports it, need additional research and 
development, the capabilities that Shotspotter brings to 
the table are impressive to say the least.  As a 







A.  SHOTSPOTTER AS AN EDGE TOOL 
Shotspotter certainly has the potential to become a 
very valuable tool for edge actors. The goal in applying 
this law-enforcement technology to military applications is 
to give added capabilities to the tactical units actually 
under gunfire. The ability to quickly and precisely locate 
the position of an enemy is a capability that will enhance 
our edge units’ ability to quickly react to unexpected 
threats. This is especially true in the urban, asymmetric 
warfare that our military is likely to continue to face in 
the future. This capability will make edge organizations 
much more agile, allowing them to quickly orient themselves 
on the battlefield. Furthermore, the blue force tracking 
capability of the system can be a great aid in preventing 
fratricide in the future. Shotspotter can definitely become 
a technology enabler in Information Age operations, but it 
will require the further refinement of the system. 
The main issue limiting Shotspotter as an edge tool is 
the method in which it disseminates information. Currently 
Shotspotter acts specifically as a tool to the commanders 
in tactical situations. There is no effective dissemination 
of the information gathered by Shotspotter to the real edge 
actors. While there Shotspotter does display information on 
the base station, further dissemination of the information 
is done by tactical voice communications. This limits the 
role that the system can play in an edge organization. 
Shared situational awareness is one of the key tenets of 
self-synchronization. Currently Shotspotter does not share 
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situation awareness in a fashion that will suit a truly 
edge-organized military. 
The advances to make Shotspotter a valuable tool to 
edge actors are mainly hindered by technology. There must 
be a way to instantly share the information gathered by the 
base station with all the members of an edge unit. 
Shotspotter Inc. has developed a wrist watch that displays 
key information on it, but this has had mixed results. The 
Marines that tested the system with the watch during EA I 
made note that the watch just wasn’t helpful enough. The 
creation of a new system for information distribution or 
the improvement of the watch should be a key goal of future 
system generations. The concept of the watch display unit 
is certainly in line with the concepts of Power to the Edge 
but there must be further development. Technology will 
limit this development until there is more bandwidth, 
better display units and a higher reliability in the 
location provided by Shotspotter. 
 
B.  EXTENDED AWARENESS AS AN EDGE EXPERIMENT 
The Extended Awareness series of experiments has gone 
a long way in increasing the use of helpful technology on 
the future battlefield. It has definitely fielded a number 
of systems that could be invaluable to edge actors during 
future operations should our military transform itself into 
and edge organization. However, if this is to happen, then 
experimentation must be aligned with the concepts of Power 
to the Edge. This section will create a picture of what EA 
II would look like if it had been organized by Power to the 
Edge principles as opposed to those of FCBA. Before getting 
into the proposed changes to the EA II architecture, it 
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should be noted that since Power to the Edge is a forward 
looking document, some of the changes require bandwidth 
that is not available with current technology.  
The main change to EA II would have been to shift the 
focus of activity from the JMSM to the actual convoy. EA II 
was set up in traditional hierarchical fashion, with the 
mission commander directing his units through a convoy 
situation. As there were changes in events, the mission 
commander would relay new orders to the convoy throughout 
the experiment. To be an edge experiment there would have 
been a set mission for the convoy, i.e. delivery of 
supplies, show of force, reconnaissance, with a defined 
commander’s intent and previously developed ROE. The convoy 
would have been sent on the mission, entrusted to adapt to 
threats they encountered on the convoy route. The role of 
the mission commander would have been to monitor the convoy 
and dynamically change the mission objectives or ROE as he 
saw fit. His direct control over the convoy would have been 
limited though. This would have increased the agility of 
the convoy to deal immediately with situations that arose 
in a manner in line with the commander’s intent and ROE.  
Another change to the experiment would have been the 
creation of better situational awareness in the convoy. The 
main aim of EA II was to maintain excellent situational 
awareness for the mission commander and then pass down the 
intelligence and orders he deemed important to the convoy. 
If it had been an edge experiment, the goal would have been 
to have the technology in place to maintain excellent 
situational awareness in the convoy. Then the members of 
the convoy would dynamically network to sensor assets as 
they deemed necessary. This would create information flows 
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that were “horizontal, independent of chain of command” as 
envisioned in Power to the Edge.33  
In practical terms, this horizontal information flow 
would mean the ability of the convoy to directly connect to 
resources for sensor information or intelligence. 
Specifically the convoy commander would be able to network 
with the ScanEagle ground control station to request 
information that he deemed necessary to mission 
accomplishment. This would require the creation in the 
experiment test plan of a number of different situations 
along the convoy route that would require the dynamic 
networking of the convoy to different sensors. Or perhaps 
it would simply require the use of sensors in different 
capacities in different situations. For example, the 
ScanEagle UAV could be used in concert with Shotspotter and 
CoT to locate the enemy, then to investigate the convoy 
route ahead and then finally to help the convoy commander 
maintain his SA during combat operations. The ability to 
adapt to situations is what needs to be tested with edge 
experiments. 
 
C.  POWER TO THE EDGE COMMAND AND CONTROL IMPLICATIONS 
1. Technology 
Transforming the military into and edge organization 
will require major changes to the current military 
structure, culture and TTPs (Techniques, Tactics, and 
Procedures).  One of the biggest changes we can expect in 
the future is vast improvements in technology as a whole.  
Optimistically, by 2050 bandwidth, connectivity, and 
computing power all will be problems of the past.  As such, 
                     33 Alberts and Hayes, 218.  
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edge organizations can not effectively function with 
present day technology.  Shared situational awareness 
demands nearly unlimited bandwidth.  Considering how 
quickly bandwidth technology has been progressing, 
bandwidth constraints should be all but eliminated by 2050.  
Computing power should not be an issue, again, because of 
the rapid developments in computing speeds.  Connectivity, 
however, may still be a problem.  Physical limitations of 
the frequency spectrum will eventually stop connections 
from working.  As technology races ahead, certain physical 
restraints will still remain.  For instance, one of the 
Marines participating in the EA-I experiment pointed out 
that none of these technologies would work in a bunker, or 
beneath ground because of their wireless nature.  
Situations absent from a commander’s omnipresent orders are 
precisely where an empowered edge would be necessary.  
 
2. HSI (Human System Interface) 
Systems will have to improve their human interface.  
If a specialist is necessary to successfully conjure 
information from the GIG, then the system is not good 
enough.  Our forces need throngs of battlefield sensors to 
exceed the limits of human observation, not to overwork an 
already burdened cognitive process.  This function is still 
performed by an omniscient battlefield commander.  
Nevertheless, as seen in EA-II, a 3 or 4 minute turnaround 
on a SALUTE report from higher-up is too slow.  
Communications were performed through typed chat during EA-
II.  This system worked fairly well in a controlled 
environment, but will likely fail in the chaos of battle.  
HSI development will need to evolve to let command come 
from a medium that is less intensive and laborious.   
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3. Commanders Still in Command 
War is an amorphous process that demands expediency.  
Today’s wars are fought with increasing speed, and the wars 
of our future are likely to follow suit.  In the 
Information Age, speed will be the most critical element on 
the battlefield, not force size.  Current Command and 
Control doctrine is changing to meet these needs, but will 
eventually peak under a hierarchical control structure.   
Power to the Edge may not, specifically, be the answer 
to fighting wars in the Information Age, but ideas about 
quickening the pace of our situational awareness are vital.  
The OODA loop will always be a part of the battlefield as 
long as people are involved.  If one was to look at the 
decision-making process like an electrical circuit, the 
difference between an edge organization and a hierarchy 
would be like the difference between a set of resistors in 
parallel versus a set of resistors in series, respectively.  
If situational awareness and information are ubiquitous, 
however, then there is no reason why commanders and edge 
actors can’t arrive at the same conclusion at the same 
time.   
While Power to the Edge promotes the empowerment of 
edge actors, it does not negate the importance command and 
control will play in the success of our forces in the 
Information Age battlefield.  In the same way Special 
Forces (SF) are empowered through commander’s intent, edge 
organizations become empowered too.  SF still follow 
orders, but are able to act quickly and decisively in 
changing environments due to their ability to self-
synchronize.  Ultimately, our conventional forces will need 
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to begin resembling our Special Forces if they are to adapt 
at the speeds necessary to win tomorrow’s wars.  
Conversely, SF operations generally have a narrow focus and 
small unit sizes, virtues that traditional forces may never 
have.  The genuine challenge facing our future forces is 
how to act with the speed and flexibility practiced by SF 
forces, but with a larger force, like a division.  Power to 
the Edge and FCBA are merely two concepts to achieve 
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